Inna V. Kaliberda
Inna V. Kaliberda

Inna V. Kaliberda
Dr. Sci (Eng), Academic Adviser, Federal Budget Institution “Scientific and Engineering Centre for Energy Safety”, Moscow, Russian Federation


Publications

Ensuring earthquake resistance of hydraulic structures in case of earthquakes
Issue: #3-2023
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A significant number of hydroelectric power plants (hereinafter referred to as HPPs) are located in areas of high seismicity (7 or more points) in Russia. Ensuring the safety of hydraulic structures (hereinafter – GTS) Hydroelectric power plants in case of earthquakes is an urgent task. The authors of the article point out the lack of sufficient justification for the seismic resistance of the GTS due to the fact that the regulatory regulation of the safety of GTS under seismic impacts was developed in Russia and abroad only at the end of the 20th century, therefore, the GTS that have been in operation for a long time were not designed taking into account seismic impacts. In this regard, there is a risk of their vulnerability to earthquakes. The article provides a brief overview of foreign experience in ensuring earthquake resistance of dams in operation. An overview is given with an assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the provisions and requirements of the current regulatory framework for ensuring earthquake resistance of hydraulic structures in the Russian Federation, developed at the beginning of the 21st century. The main provisions and mandatory requirements for ensuring earthquake resistance relate to the stages of design and construction. For GTS HPP complexes in long-term operation, the application of these proposed methods requires an individual approach. The authors of the article indicate the need to develop regulatory support for the safety management of GTS in long-term operation in seismically hazardous areas.

Management of the period of operation of hydro engineering facilities of hydro power plants
Issue:
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Introduction. In recent years, the issue of the need to make decisions regarding hydraulic structures of hydroelectric power plants (hereinafter referred to as GTS HPP) that are in operation, the estimated service life of which has ended, has become relevant.

Aim. To focus attention on the lack of norms and rules for establishing the designated period of operation of hydraulic structures, on the importance of ensuring regulatory regulation by creating rules for determining the design service life and designated period of operation, criteria for the possibility of their extension, and also to outline an optimal approach to managing the period of operation of hydraulic structures of hydroelectric power plants during their operation.

Materials and method. Federal laws and other regulatory legal acts are considered for the presence in them of provisions and requirements for the purpose of service life and period of operation, criteria for the possibility of extending the designated period of operation of GTS facilities for various purposes, including GTS hydroelectric power plants. According to SP 58.13330.2019 "Hydraulic structures. The main provisions. Updated version of SNiP 33-01-2003" the assigned estimated service life of the first and second class GTS is 100 years, the third and fourth class GTS is 50 years. This norm was established in 2013. The terms and definitions of service life, designated period of operation.

Results. An analytical review is provided on the state of regulatory support in the Russian Federation in order to determine the rules for designate period of operation of hydraulic structures, information on the practice of decision-making abroad on managing the designated period of operation of hydraulic structures, their conservation, reconstruction or liquidation. The experience of managing the designated period of operation of nuclear power plants is considered. Proposals have been formulated for managing the established period of operation of hydraulic structures of hydroelectric power stations when the service life of hydraulic structures of hydroelectric power stations is exceeded.

 Conclusions. Proposals have been formulated to ensure regulatory regulation for the purpose of determining the period of operation, criteria for the possibility of extending the period of operation, and managing the designated period of operation of hydraulic structures of hydroelectric power stations during their operation.

Seismic damages of electric grid facilities
Issue: #1-2022
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Electric grid facilities (EGF) are the part of life support system of territories. About of 30% of EGF of RF lay in the zone of 7 and more units of 12-units seismic scale MSK-64. Experience shows the damageability of EGF at earthquakes. In conditions of earthquake EGF objects show less seismic resistance than objects of electric generation (electric stations). Equipment of EGF objects shows less seismic resistance than civil structures, in which it is installed.

The object of this work is to create the recommendations for improvement of seismic resistance of main EGF objects – electric transmission lines (ETL) and transformer substations (TSS) – on the base of analysis of typical damages of these objects.

Analysis shows that main reasons of seismic damages of air ETL are elastic oscillations of transmission towers as well as their opposite mutual movement if occurs in different phases of seismic wave. Elastic oscillations cause deformation of truss angles due to shear force, damage of foundation and rupture of earth conductors. Opposite mutual movements cause dynamic changes of tension of line of air ETL, rupture of line conductors and rupture of cables of cable ETL

Main equipment of TSS includes power transformers, switching equipment and apparatus of relay defense and automatics (RDA). Seismic damages of power transformers are mainly caused by their displacements at earthquake. As a result of the displacements occur jerks and damages to electrical connections - flexible (wires) or rigid (bushing), which cause increase in the forces transmitted to the transformer insulators (porcelain) and lead to breakage of the latter, short circuits and fires. Main damages of switching equipment at earthquakes are connected with the cracking and break of porcelain insulating columns which are often used as a support of switching apparatus. This causes damage and fall of apparatus. Damages of RDA are mainly connected with deformation and fall of electric cabinets and also with fault or false action of contact elements with not enough seismic resistance.

On the base of analysis of seismic damages of equipment of EGF objects the recommendations for improvement of their seismic resistance are proposed.